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1 Is there a need for global rules?
Concerns about competition and trade have a long
pedigree, back to Adam Smith. The 1947 Havana
Charter of the abortive International Trade
Organisation (ITO) included a requirement of
members to police international restrictive business
practices:
Each Member shall take appropriate measures
and shall cooperate with the Organisation to
prevent, on the part of private or public
commercial enterprises, business practices
affecting international trade which restrain
competition, limit access to markets, or foster
monopolistic control, whenever such practices
have harmful effects on the expansion of
production or trade and interfere with the
achievement of any of the other objectives set
forth in Article 1 (UN 1947: Article 46, para. 1).
The Havana Charter would have left the
“appropriate means” up to the member. The ITO as
an organisation would have been called upon to
investigate any complaints not resolved by
consultation and make recommendations for
action, but had no provision for a judicial system. It
allowed for intergovernmental cooperation, and
also provided a means for dealing with disputes in
the service sector. The aim of today’s World Trade
Organization (WTO) discussions remains that of
preventing private business practices from
nullifying the benefits of the removal of
governmental barriers to trade, even if the proposed
means of achieving this aim are very different.
The topic “trade and competition policy” was put
on the WTO agenda by the Singapore Ministerial
meeting in 1996. A decision was taken to set up a
working group to consider this interface. The
working group is strictly for discussions only but
its work has influenced the attitudes of WTO
members towards the possibility of such
negotiations and its reports give a valuable account
of the evolution of the debate.2
A fundamental requirement to justify a multilateral
agreement on competition must be that, in some
senses, anti-competitive practices in one
jurisdiction may have spillover effects in the global
economy, as may national policies towards them.
These are admirably reviewed in WTO (1997). ButIDS Bulletin Vol 34 No 2 2003
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it does not follow that the existence of spillovers
automatically means that a WTO agreement could
actually solve the problems created.
We must ask first: is there evidence that cross-border
anti-competitive behaviour is a problem? This seems
to be agreed. However, three further questions arise:
1. Why cannot national governments take the
necessary action?
2. What advantages does a multilateral agreement
have over other forms of cross-border
cooperation?
3. What forms should appropriate action take?
1.1 Evidence on anti-competitive
behaviour
In answer to the first question there is powerful
evidence that cross-border cartels are active and are
not being adequately policed. In the 1990s the
United States (US) Department of Justice became
enormously active investigating and prosecuting
cartels in industries such as vitamins, steel, and
animal feeds. They uncovered evidence on a
massive scale of global violations. The Citric Acid
and Lysine cartels involved global markets of
around US$2 billion in the late 1990s. These
developments prompted the Department of Justice
to set up an International Competition Policy
Advisory Committee (ICPAC). Its report (ICPAC
2000) found that cartels existed on a large scale.
Extensive work at the World Bank carried out and
reviewed by Evenett suggests that nearly 7 per cent
of imports into developing countries were in
sectors where firms had been found by the US
authorities to be involved in cartels. Evenett and
Clarke (2002) show evidence that indicates that
the impact of the international vitamins cartel
prosecuted by the USA authorities was more
serious in those developing countries that had no
competition law.
1.2 Reasons for intervening
It is very important to distinguish two different
reasons for attempting to curb anti-competitive
activity because WTO members attribute different
weight to them. They may involve market access;
that is to say where private barriers to entry have
been created by local firms against the will of
certain foreign suppliers. Or they may involve pure
international antitrust issues, where collusive or
monopolistic behaviour by all firms is directed
explicitly against consumers. In both cases
consumers lose out, but a solution that “shares”
markets may satisfy exporters (and hence, the
instigators of the enquiry), but it does nothing for
consumers. In neither case (although for different
reasons) will uncoordinated action by domestic
competition authorities solve the problem.
Market access
Anti-competitive collusion in a domestic market
may be a very effective way to keep out imports,
especially if distributors and wholesalers are
involved. US policy makers and business circles
expressed great frustration at US exporters’ failed
attempts to gain access to the Japanese market.
From the mid-1980s on, the USA argued that the
Japanese authorities had tolerated their own firms
engaging in anti-competitive business practices, in
particular through vertical integration between
producers and distributors. A vast legal and
economic literature emerged on whether Japan’s
markets were relatively more closed than other
nations’ markets, with little agreement emerging
(Evenett and Suslow (2000) survey much of this
debate).
In the early years of the establishment of the
European Common Market (EEC), the need to
ensure market access led to the establishment of a
supra-national competition policy with the goal of
preventing private actions causing distortions to
trade between member states. In 1957, only
Germany had a vigorous domestic competition
policy. The Rome Treaty gave the European
Commission powers to intervene directly and
control anti-competitive behaviour by firms. This
addressed the problem identified in the Havana
Charter, but went further than the Charter in
giving the executive the authority to act, not merely
to report and recommend.
The jurisdiction of the European Commission was,
and strictly speaking still is, limited to practices
affecting cross-border trade. The EEC did not
create an internal competition regime for its
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members. At that time, market access
considerations led to a focus on the interests of
exporters rather than consumers, but the effect has
been positive for consumers as well as producers.
At the global level there is a further problem. A
supra-national authority is unthinkable.3 The
government in the exporting state has no
jurisdiction in the “protected” market. And the
competition authorities in the target market are, by
definition, unable or unwilling to remove the
barriers.
It is not surprising that when the view emerged
that inadequate competition policy enforcement
could undermine the expected market access gains
from trade reforms, some began to argue that
international disciplines on competition policies
were necessary to ensure market access. It was
natural to think then of this taking place within the
WTO: bargaining over market access concessions
in multilateral trade negotiations has been the time
honoured and highly effective means of lowering
border barriers. But by 1996, the USA had come to
the conclusion that it could use its own unilateral
and bilateral instruments to achieve these ends.
Consequently, the demand that trade and
competition should be on the post-SingaporeWTO
agenda came essentially from the European Union
(EU).
Antitrust
International antitrust concerns primarily relate to
the effect on consumer welfare of agreements or
acts by dominant firms or cartels. They may, for
example, charge excessive prices for exports. A
dominant firm or cartel may also use power in one
market to leverage its position in another, e.g. by
predatory behaviour.
The antitrust remedy is likely to be different from
that for market access. Indeed, the dynamics are
almost exactly opposite. In the case of market access
the problems are that the authority for the market in
which the anti-competitive behaviour occurs is
unwilling to act, while the authority that wishes to
act has no jurisdiction. With antitrust the problem
is that the authority of the economy experiencing
the anti-competitive behaviour has jurisdiction but
is unable in practice to act, while the other authority
has the means, but is unwilling to do so.
Evidently, very different and complementary WTO
rules would be needed to deal with these two
situations. And this dichotomy has direct relevance
to the issues raised in the Bulletin because there is a
tendency for developing countries to focus on one
cause and the industrialised countries on the other.
Developing countries are mainly concerned about
abuses by Northern exporters, while the EU and
the USA’s concern is about import cartels.
The cross-border effect in the export cartel is failure
by the home jurisdiction to act against the anti-
competitive behaviour of “its firms” in another
market. Consider also the case of international
mergers, which pose problems that were not
foreseen when the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) was created in 1947. A merger
between two firms may be allowed by the
competition authorities in the “home” market
because there remains plenty of domestic
competition. But this may not be true of the markets
in which their subsidiaries operate. There, the new
combined entity may have a dominant position.
National competition authorities have as their
objective only the interests of their own
jurisdiction. Thus, while the EU and the USA take
into account in their decisions the effects on their
economies of actions taken elsewhere, they do not
consider the effect on foreign markets of actions by
their firms; these are captured if at all only as a
corollary of regulation of activities on the domestic
market. Indeed, it is not unusual for competition
laws specifically to exclude sectors of activity where
foreigners may be the main victims of anti-
competitive practice. Shipping conferences, for
example, have traditionally been exempted, and
many jurisdictions exempt export cartels either
explicitly or implicitly.4 But many commentators
have observed that even if there were no such
exemptions the EU or the USA governments could
not easily prosecute their own firms for harm done
to consumers elsewhere.
If governments in the parent firm’s home country
cannot act, why cannot those in countries where the
affiliates operate? The answer is they face a major
practical problem. It is unlikely that governments in
the affected country will be able to get the evidence
needed to pursue infringers even if they have
effective laws. The capacity of competition
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authorities to assess adequately all the factors in
transnational mergers may well be limited even if
there is no problem of a willingness to act. The
increasing number of international mergers and
strategic alliances where the authorities are forced to
rely on whatever information the parties supply
clearly raises the question of the need for enhanced
cooperation.
1.3 The scope for voluntary bilateral
agreements
Information sharing
Why cannot bilaterally agreed cooperation resolve
the information problem? The US position has long
been that bilateral agreements are the solution. And
there are numerous bilateral agreements between
the major industrial countries that attempt to do
this. The EU–USA agreement (1998), for example,
provides for “positive comity”. This allows requests
for other jurisdictions to take action under their
own laws when the requesting party’s interests are
affected.
The EU has made a point of incorporating
competition provisions into nearly all its recent
preferential trade agreements with countries of
Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs). These ban:
(i) all agreements between undertakings, decisions
by associations of undertakings and concerted
practices between undertakings which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition; and (ii) abuse by one or
more undertakings of a dominant position in the
territories of the Community or of [the partner
country] as a whole or in a substantial part
thereof, if they may affect trade between the two
partners (EC–Poland 1993).
The agreements declare that the meaning of these
terms shall be that used in the EU under what are
now Articles 81 and 82 (formerly Articles 85 and
86). This has been widely seen as dictation by the
EU of what form of domestic competition policy
the partners should have, even though it
technically leaves the associates free to achieve this
end by their own means. However, its relationship
with the CEECs means that the EU can make such
demands, largely due to the carrot of membership
and the stick of exclusion.
ICPAC (2000) and Janow (2000) show the
weakness of more conventional bilateral
agreements between sovereign states. There is no
obligation to exchange confidential information –
in fact there is no obligation to do anything – merely
a right of request, even when the agreement
includes the so-called “positive comity” provision.
The requested jurisdiction can act only on matters,
which would be illegal under its own laws.
As a result, the USA has sought to replace the
cooperation agreements with Multilateral Legal
Assistance Treaties (MLATs). Obligations under an
MLAT would be much stronger than in the EU–US
agreement. But there are few of these as yet, and in
particular developing countries rarely secure
cooperation agreements with their major trading
partners in the North. The main exception is the
USA–Brazil agreement (1999).
Yet the practical difficulties of bilateral agreements
may be overstated. Despite misgivings, Janow
(2000) also reports that the EU and US authorities
routinely manage to agree on common definitions
of the relevant market where both are looking at
the same case.
Nonetheless, we cannot rule out conflicts such as
occurred in the GE–Honeywell case, where the EU
blocked a merger approved in the USA, and
moreover there are almost no bilateral agreements
with developing countries. The EU–South Africa
Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement
of 1999 (European Council 1999) contains similar
provisions to the EU–Poland accord, but does not
spell out the detailed competition policy criteria to
be used by South Africa. The EU–Mexico Free
Trade Agreement of 2000 contains similarly vague
provisions (EC–Mexico Joint Council 2000: Article
39 and Annexe XV).
It may be unrealistic to assume that a full web of
bilateral arrangements could be set up, given the
lack of progress so far. All in all, the evidence that
existing procedures are adequate is less than
compelling. The big questions are whether:
n feasible multilateral agreements without some
sort of asymmetry in favour of developing
countries could help development goals, and
whether
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n asymmetrical agreements are feasible, given
that developing countries have little to offer the
EU and the USA by way of cooperation.
So far, as we noted, the only significant
developed–developing country cooperation
agreement is that between the USA and Brazil.
Some disappointment has been expressed over the
usefulness of this, and the key question is whether
a WTO agreement would reflect the existing
asymmetries or be a way to allow developing
countries to get round them by “free riding” on
some newly created multilateral obligations that
developed countries would take on.
Free trade
But is competition policy the only, or the best,
route to overcoming anti-competitive behaviour? It
is sometimes asserted that, in the absence of any
government-sponsored barriers to trade and to
investment, national competition policy is
unnecessary.
Empirical studies have certainly borne out the
claim that trade reform helps reduce the exercise of
market power by domestic firms (Tybout 2000).
However, it has not been shown that removing
tariffs eliminates all domestic market power. Even
if such a finding did emerge, it would apply only to
markets in which goods are tradable. Although it
could be argued that open foreign direct
investment regimes could inject competitive
pressures into non-tradable sectors, the EU and US
antitrust experience demonstrates that even in
competitive economies some markets remain open
to anti-competitive practices.
Thus, the available empirical evidence suggests that
trade liberalisation is not a perfect substitute for an
active competition policy. Although liberal trade is
a very important and powerful pro-competitive
policy, there remains a place for an active
competition policy, particularly in larger
developing countries.
1.4 Could a multilateral accord
overcome these problems?
We have thus a case for some form of international
agreement on the regulation of competition in the
world economy, and the WTO seems a natural
place for this if there is to be a binding element.
Although the EU is busy creating a web of bilateral
agreements, there is a strong argument that so
many overlapping and possibly inconsistent
agreements are inadequate and inefficient.
Objections on grounds of practicality
US officials point out that a multilateral agreement
is not an alternative to bilaterals. The Clinton
administration argued for stronger bilateral and
voluntary cooperation outside the WTO. ICPAC
(2000) highlighted the global dimension of
antitrust and the weaknesses of existing
arrangements, but argued firmly against WTO
involvement:
At this juncture, the majority of the Advisory
Committee believes that the WTO as a forum
for review of private restraints is not
appropriate. Given the possible risks, and the
lack of international consensus on the content
or appropriateness of rules or dispute
settlement in this area, this Advisory
Committee believes that the WTO should not
develop new competition rules under its
umbrella (ICPAC 2000).
The experience with even strong bilateral
agreements has served to emphasise their problems
in the eyes of critics. The USA has passed an
International Antitrust Enforcement Act providing
a framework for bilateral cooperation, but so far it
has spawned only one agreement: with Australia.
Objections on grounds of political non-feasibility
The failure of bilateral agreements with teeth to
spread may reflect an underlying resistance to
cross-border regulation, an objection that would
apply a fortiori to a meaningful WTO accord. EU
industry, for example, is strongly opposed to any
agreements that would oblige the EU to give
confidential information to the US authorities.
Business fears that information given to the
Commission, if shared, might lead to penalties in
the USA, including criminal imprisonment.
Although the USA recently proposed an
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) agreement that would
enjoin members to act against all cartels which
were already illegal under their existing laws, this
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did not include a commitment to police all export
cartels. Even the EU, desirous as it is to see
enhanced cooperation, has some problems with a
commitment to police the anti-competitive
behaviour of its own firms in export markets.
There has been quite strong political reticence from
the competition policy community itself.
Competition specialists do not want their turf
taken over by trade officials. They are afraid that
certain mercantilist goals may supersede efficiency
aims. Some developing countries, on the other
hand, worry that efficiency-only goals would
predominate in a WTO competition agreement.
Nevertheless, many competition laws contain aims
other than competitive efficiency, and so there is no
a priori reason why this should not also be the case
at the multilateral level. EU policy supports the
survival of small firms, and South African law
requires competition authorities to take account of
the interest of historically disadvantaged people.
Advantages of multilateralism
In many respects, a multilateral accord would
suffer from the same problems as a bilateral
agreement, but in other regards, it may be able to
overcome problems. International antitrust
enforcement is in large part a public good. Any
country that offers to take other countries’ interests
into account without an assurance that others will
do the same incurs a cost. A multilateral agreement
would increase this assurance.
But is it the case that everyone is likely to be willing
to adopt effective antitrust enforcement if others
agree to do the same? As we noted, there are certain
interests that are against more effective
international enforcement. Nevertheless, almost all
governments see the desirability of competitive
markets. The fact that there are real differences of
opinion does not mean that agreement is
impossible, but it helps explain why it has not yet
been reached.
Could we devise aWTO regime with benefits greater
than costs for everyone? If so what form would it
take? What is clear from the discussions is that the
idea of an international agency reporting on, and
eventually policing, international competition issues
is not even being discussed at the WTO. What is
being discussed is much more modest.
The EU would like all (or nearly all) WTO
members to have their own competition law, and
calls for the creation of stronger modalities for
cooperation. It does not seek a global equivalent of
its Competition Directorate. Fox (1999) argues that
the international competition issue should be split:
there should be a general WTO obligation to have
a competition law that ensures market access is not
unreasonably impaired, but all other matters
should be left to other fora.
Even a minimalist WTO role of this kind causes
some fears. Many analysts have argued that there
are substantial differences in philosophy between
jurisdictions (and between trade and competition
officials). But such divergence may be
disappearing. As discussions have proceeded at the
WTO and the OECD, there has been a clarification
of what is commonly agreed and what is not. There
is a consensus that non-discrimination and
transparency are key disciplines that everyone
should respect, though even these concepts cause
problems for some players. The EU is seeking to
place the emphasis on ensuring transparency. This
might mean allowing governments quite a lot of
freedom to carve out exceptions from non-
discrimination, e.g. in providing that take-overs on
a certain sector would only be allowed for national
firms, but with WTO rules insisting that all such
exceptions were registered as part of the country’s
commitment at theWTO. There is a similar logic in
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
agreement.
2 Should the rules apply to
developing countries?
The previous section showed that a cross-border
competition policy may be needed for antitrust
remedies in some cases. Developing countries
might consider that they had most to gain from a
regime that would constrain international cartels
and the exercise of undue market power by firms
from developed country jurisdictions. On the
other hand, they see little gain from an obligation
to have their own competition laws, which is
something they can choose to do (or not to do) for
themselves.
In practice, developing countries are currently
divided over the desirability of a WTO
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competition agreement. South Africa and some
Latin Americans are favourably inclined, but Asian
countries are more sceptical. Officially India has
argued that, while they recognise the multilateral
dimension of competition policy and support the
work of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD), they want to see
some of the basic systemic issues of the WTO
sorted out before new areas are included in
negotiations. But there are influential counter
views. The Consumer Unity and Trust Society
(CUTS) Institute in Jaipur has argued on the basis
of extensive research that the problem for India is
not that WTO rules will force an unwelcome new
approach; it is that its own authorities are
insufficiently active in enforcing even existing laws
(see CUTS 2001).
What is being proposed by the EU, and so far there
are no explicit alternative agendas on the table, is
essentially that a minimalist WTO regime should
be established with two elements:
n Certain core obligations for domestic
competition policy for all WTO members
(subject to potential special and differential
treatment (SDT) opt-outs), and
n A framework for voluntary international
cooperation.
Such an agreement, obliging members to have a
competition law of some kind, would have an
immediate effect only on those countries that do
not have a competition law at present. These are
mainly developing countries plus those, such as
Hong Kong, who argue that an open trade regime
is sufficient to guarantee fully competitive
markets.5 Why would developing countries need a
WTO competition code to adopt domestic laws
that they could adopt unilaterally?
An initial question, therefore, is how far developing
countries should be, and are, introducing domestic
competition policies; only if some are not doing so
would the first element provide any new
commitment. A second question is what would
they have to gain from voluntary cooperation.
Finally, how do the rules need to be adapted to
ensure maximum benefits for developing countries
and minimal compliance costs?
2.1 Is competition policy good for
development?
The tally of countries with competition laws shows
the number increasing every year. Competition
policy is spreading in sub-Saharan Africa, and there
is a growing interest in the need for vigorous
competition policy to assist the transition from
economies dominated by parastatals. South Africa
has been in the vanguard of promoting the use of
competition policy as a way of achieving both
economic and social ends, to make industry more
competitive for export markets and to
deconcentrate power. Developing countries are
also increasingly aware of the danger posed by
international cartels and anti-competitive practices
regarding distribution.
Should other developing countries follow suit?
Although there is little empirical evidence on the
link between competition and growth, some
studies do find a significant correlation between
countries’ growth and their use of competition
policy (Tybout 2000; Dutz and Hayri 2000). Some
other authors have been more sceptical however,
stressing the costs (see McCulloch et al. 2002). But
Evenett and Clarke (2002) argue that the benefits
of deterring even one anti-competitive case such as
the vitamins cartel would pay for the running of a
competition office. A study on Peru (Caceres 2000)
argued that the economic benefits were about six
times the costs.
2.2 What about World Trade
Organization rules?
While there exists a prima facie case that it would
be in developing countries’ interests to have a
domestic competition law if they do not already do
so, real difficulties are created for some by several
core principles that would be in a WTO agreement.
“National treatment” is a bugbear to some. This
means that a country’s law must treat foreign and
domestic firms equally. India argues that this is
equal treatment of unequals. The main concern
expressed is that multinational firms with deep
pockets will be able to engage in unfair
competition. Many of these concerns could be
dealt with by targeting the kinds of behaviour
feared (which could be undertaken by powerful
domestic firms too). But the one concern that must
be faced head on is where the government has a
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political preference to favour ownership of
industry by nationals, or a particular group of the
local population.
While a WTO commitment to have a domestic
competition policy would not address global
antitrust issues directly, it could be seen as a
necessary condition. There is little scope for
cooperation on cartels if a country does not have a
competition law. And the goal of better
international cooperation in antitrust (albeit
voluntary) could be a positive attraction for
developing countries. “Positive comity” would not
go very far, but a real commitment to share
information and expertise where cartels had been
discovered in industrial countries could be a major
benefit. It is a benefit however, that could be taken
up only by a country that had a competition law.
A step further would be if countries that agree to
have a competition law obtain significant
additional rights, above all in terms of cooperation.
This is more likely to involve discussion and
exchange of information than an attempt to
address the really sensitive matters such as multi-
jurisdictional review of mergers. No country is
likely to give up the right to review cases, but there
are things that can usefully be done even here, e.g.
agreeing ways to define relevant markets, etc.
A particularly interesting area for developing
countries, though a very sensitive one, is the use of
competition policy to curb the potential abuse of
patents. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) provides a
right for host and importing countries to control
patent abuses through competition law. This is a
little-used provision, which should be reaffirmed
and strengthened in any competition agreement.
But it is one that cannot easily be exploited by a
country that has no competition law.
3 What kind of World Trade
Organization policy is on the
agenda?
There exists a modest case, therefore, that a
multilateral requirement about domestic
competition policies would not, in itself, be unduly
onerous and could have advantages. Since the
advantage is primarily the ability to benefit from
other, voluntary, cooperation, its scale will depend
upon how much cooperation WTO members are
willing to provide in practice. Hence, there is a risk:
mandatory provisions now in return for non-
mandatory gains later. And, with the Uruguay
Round experience behind them, developing
countries are clearly risk averse in the WTO. They
fear that proposals, which look modest now, might
grow into something more burdensome, and that
the benefits dangled before them may disappear
once their signature is on the document.
What danger is there that this would be the thin
end of an unwelcome wedge? The key choice for
developing countries is whether to take the gamble
that negotiations now offer an opportunity to
strengthen competitive disciplines in global
markets or whether they should merely opt to keep
discussions going in the working group.
The basic proposals on the table reflected in
documents of the WTO working group seek a
binding commitment that members introduce
some sort of competition law, but of a rather
limited nature and potentially subject to
exemptions of a developmental kind. Dispute
settlement would not apply to the way in which
policy was applied, but only to whether a member
state’s laws were de jure compatible with the
commitments it had signed up to. Alongside this
mandatory requirement would be a legal
framework for voluntary international cooperation.
The problem for critics is that developing countries
would acquire an additional legal obligation
(however diluted) to adopt a competition law,
while for developed countries there would be only
a moral obligation to share information, etc.
3.1 The positions of the big players
Hence, it seems likely that there will need to be
further development of current positions before a
deal is ripe for the making. How far would this
need to go? This section summarises the positions
of three big players and then compares two of
them: the EU and India, to determine whether or
not the gap is bridgeable.
The EU
In 2001, the Director General for Trade at the
Commission Mogens Peter Carl said:6
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What we are proposing is to introduce, into the
WTO, provisions that require its members to
adopt certain minimum standards and core
principles as it relates to their domestic
competition laws and regulations and to respect
certain requirements of international
cooperation between competition authorities.
The establishment of a domestic competition
policy and a competition authority with
sufficient enforcement powers remain the basis,
in the absence of which a country would not be
able to address anti-competitive practices of a
domestic or international character (Carl 2001).
The EU’s aims, he argued, were the following:
More specifically, we suggest that WTO
negotiations should focus on three key issues:
1. Core principles of domestic competition
law and policy.
2. Cooperation between competition
authorities, including both specific cases and
more general cooperation and exchange of
information.
3. Technical assistance and capacity-building
for the reinforcement of competition
institutions in developing countries (Carl
2001).
The EU acknowledges that there are international
differences in approach, but seeks to build on
common ground by saying that every country’s
competition law must ban “hard-core cartels”.7 The
Commission sees this as the central plank in any
effective multilateral competition regime. It argues
strongly that the adoption of common core
principles, to include non-discrimination and
transparency, should not conflict with other
development objectives. That is to say, any
competition commitments should not affect other
development policies, which would still be subject
to normal WTO disciplines.
The Commission has also suggested that countries
wishing to exclude sectors from competition rules
or from national treatment provisions should be free
to do so, subject only to the proviso that exclusions
must be transparent and hence predictable for
economic actors. Their model is perhaps similar to
some elements in the GATS. It is worth
remembering that WTO members are already
subject to “national treatment” rules for all policies
that might affect trade (under GATT Article III). It is
not clear if the EU plan would actually widen these
obligations; in fact the EU plan would probably
narrow the obligations by allowing exemptions.
The EU places great stress on the benefits of a
framework for cooperation, which they argue
would be helped by some agreement on common
principles. They stress, however, that the
requirement to undertake cooperation will be
“voluntary” in that it will be to consider requests not
to act on them. This gets around the problem of
onerous procedural obligations, but it leaves open
the complaint that the EU can also refuse assistance
to developing countries, even though one of its aims
is said to ‘include responding to the longstanding
developing country concerns about the importance
of assistance by “home” competition authorities in
those cases in which foreign firms may be engaged
in anti-competitive practices with an impact on
developing country markets’ (EC 2001).
The USA
The US view, which was sceptical about WTO
involvement under Clinton, has moved on under
Bush. Robert Zoellick has said:8
In competition policy, U.S. trade and antitrust
authorities recognize the significance of the
issue. Therefore, we are working to understand
more clearly what the EU seeks, and are
discussing with the EU how it can
accommodate the concerns of the United States
and other countries.
But Zoellick also expresses doubts:
What is not clear to us, however, is how
competition obligations based on the core
principles should be assessed; for example, the
important question of how dispute settlement
might operate or whether other forms of
oversight such as peer review might be more
satisfactory.8
The EU responds that dispute settlement will not
cover cases and enforcement, but only the
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consistency of laws with commitments on core
principles; for the rest it favours peer review. The
EU does have something to offer the USA, namely
enhanced antitrust enforcement cooperation. It
might need to go further and be ready to exchange
confidential information with the USA, although
whether this is a priority for the USA will have to
be determined.
India
India was in the past a supporter of a trade and
competition agreement, but is now the leading
opponent. Its main argument is that the kind of
cooperation offered by the EU would not amount
to anything worthwhile.
A recent Indian paper can be read almost as a
statement of conditions under which it would
subscribe to a global competition agreement.
Until such time as developed countries are
willing to consider the impact of mergers on
consumers in foreign countries, to rescind the
exemption of export cartels in their
competition laws, to give serious consideration
to enforcing the UNCTAD Set of measures to
control RBPs [restrictive business practices],
and to extend the benefits of “positive comity”
in competition law enforcement to developing
countries, the latter will have to retain the right
to challenge foreign mergers and RBPs that
have an effect on domestic consumers
(Government of India 2002).
3.2 How far apart are the EU and
India?
How different is the Indian and the EU position?
Let us consider the various elements of the Indian
position in turn:
1. To consider the impact of mergers on
consumers in foreign countries.
2. To rescind the exemption of export cartels in
their competition laws.
3. To give serious consideration to enforcing the
UNCTAD ‘Set ofMultilaterally Agreed Equitable
Principles and Rules for the Control of
Restrictive Business Practices’ (UNCTAD 1980).
4. To extend the benefits of “positive comity” in
competition law enforcement to developing
countries.
Points 1, 2 and 4 go in the same direction: the
Indians are asking for the EU and the USA to take
account of foreign consumers in decisions on cartels
and mergers. But the wording of the first two points
is subtly different. Point 1 asks developed countries
to ‘consider the impact’ of mergers, a soft demand.
What is meant by ‘consider’? Gathering information
on the worldwide implications for competition is
not the same as asking for mergers which do no
harm at home to be stopped because they do harm
elsewhere.
Point 2 asks for an end to the exemption of export
cartels.What does this mean? It could be argued that
it has to be interpreted literally. To the extent that
domestic competition laws cover only measures
with effect in the territory of the jurisdiction, the
repeal of any explicit exemptions would do nothing
for foreign countries. Only if there were a positive
decision to take some sort of action against effects in
external markets, or at least to allow action to be
taken, would there be any benefit.
The question is how far would such amove have to
go to be meaningful?Would it be enough to require
firms found guilty of an infringement in one
jurisdiction to file in full details of their worldwide
activity? It is easier to see the EU acting against
firms that have been shown to have done
something that is illegal within the EU than against
firms that have done nothing to harm EU
consumers. Point 4, “positive comity”, requires
countries to take account of others’ interests, but
only to the extent of a country’s own law. So if
points 1 and 2 are applied in the sense of “positive
comity”, the EU would not be asked to prosecute
firms for doing things not illegal in the EU.
Hence, India is implicitly asking for a ban on export
cartels, which is not inconsistent with the EU
position. It is more likely to be opposed by the USA.
Though the EU seems at the moment to focus on
domestic cartels and on supplying non-confidential
information, it has said ‘a WTO Member should
inform other Members whose important trade
interests may be affected by ongoing investigations
and proceedings under its competition laws’ (EC
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2002). The key point of controversy is over the
extent of obligation. The EU paper specifically calls
for voluntary cooperation for all kinds of
international competition issues, except hard-core
cartels, which would be subject to mandatory
control. Hence unless a developing country had
taken an exemption it would have a legal obligation
to pursue cartels in its own market that might be
keeping Northern firms out, but no equivalent right
in relation to Northern export cartels.
Could this gap be bridged? We know that there is
no mechanism to force the EU to act on complaints
brought even by domestic consumers. It is hard to
see any international agreement on hard-core cartels
removing altogether the right of a competition
authority not to investigate domestic complaints.
Perhaps the UNCTAD ‘Set of Multilaterally Agreed
Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of
Restrictive Business Practices’ could provide a
bridge, given India’s support for it. It has a clear
difference of language from the EU’s proposals, but
no obvious inconsistency with the traditional aims
of competition policy.
The first aim of the Set is:
To ensure that restrictive business practices do
not impede or negate the realization of benefits
that should arise from the liberalization of tariff
and non-tariff barriers affecting world trade,
particularly those affecting the trade and
development of developing countries (Part IV,
Section A, para. 1).
Restrictive business practices by multinational
corporations are given prominence, but they are
not the exclusive target. The Set seeks to:
eliminate the disadvantages to trade and
development which may result from the
restrictive business practices of transnational
corporations or other enterprises, and thus help
to maximize benefits to international trade and
particularly the trade and development of
developing countries (Part IV, Section A, para. 4).
The Set’s equivalent of SDT is quite modest:
In order to ensure the equitable application of
the Set of Principles and Rules, States,
particularly developed countries, should take
into account in their control of restrictive
business practices the development, financial
and trade needs of developing countries, in
particular of the least developed countries (Part
IV, Section C, (iii)).
4 Conclusion
The implications of these ideas for SDT probably
have more to do with rights than obligations if the
EU’s proposals can be taken at face value. The
obligation on developing countries to adhere to
competition law is not enormously onerous, and
has lots of flexibility; particularly if there is room
for exceptions. Countries would also have to think
whether they really have some special need to ask
for a national treatment carve-out.
But the big question is whether the provisions for
voluntary information sharing and cooperation on
the part of developed countries would really
deliver something worth negotiating for. If this
question is adequately addressed, there is a chance
of a development friendly competition agreement.
This might evolve into something more effective as
years go by.
One possible approach would be to build upon
the fact that, to take advantage of any
opportunities provided by voluntary cooperation,
a developing country would need to have in place
an effective competition policy. SDT would then
exempt developing countries from an initial
obligation to introduce a basic competition law
with core principles, but would also recognise the
right of other WTO members (implicit in any
voluntary undertakings) not to cooperate with
countries lacking a competition policy if they
wished. The WTO texts would establish the
parameters of the required basic competition
policy (and be negotiated by all WTO members).
But the adoption of such a policy would proceed
at the pace determined by each member to be in
its interests, taking account inter alia of the
cooperation perceived to be available from other
members.
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Notes
1. This article draws heavily on earlier work with Rob
Anderson of the WTO and Bernard Hoekman of the
World Bank, who are responsible for many of the
ideas but not for the remaining and newly
introduced errors.
2. On the pros and cons see WTO (2001). 
3. Proposals on these lines in the 1990s were
vigorously shot down: see Fikentscher et al. (1993)
and Scherer (1994).
4. Some US experts believe that repealing the US
Webb-Pomerene Act, which allows export cartels,
would have no effect, as any adverse effects affecting
only foreigners are anyway legal in the USA, or
indeed anywhere else.
5. This is the strongly held position of the Hong Kong
government, but it is contested by the Hong Kong
Consumer Council.
6. See also Bercero and Amarasinha (2001).
7. See especially the EU paper for the WTO
‘International Hardcore Cartels and Cooperation
under a WTO Framework Agreement on
Competition’, WT/WGTCP/W/193, 1 July 2002.
8. In a statement made on 17 July 2001, after meeting
Pascal Lamy.
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